# **Optimal Tiered Reserve Remuneration**

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## Introduction/Research Question

- Introduction of negative interest rate policy (NIRP) in various countries/financial systems
  - To ensure accommodative stance of monetary policy
  - NIRP brings along detrimental side effects that are absent with rate cuts in positive territory
  - "...at some point the level of rates can become low to the extent that the detrimental effects on the banking sector outweigh the benefits of lower rates." (Benoît Coeuré, 2016)

## Motivation and Stylized Facts

- Setup of tiered reserve systems is very different
  - Rule in the Euro Area is of an ad-hoc fashion  $\Rightarrow 6$  times the minimum reserve requirements (MRR)
- Impact of negative reserve remuneration has become more significant over the past few years
  - Interest payments on excess liquidity in the Euro Area rose by 257% from €5 to €18.1 billion since December 2019 (as of June 2022)
- Hihgly relevant for policy, illustrated by the following quote:
  - "...assess the appropriate calibration of its two-tier system for reserve remuneration so that negative interest rate policy does not limit banks' intermediation capacity..." (Press Release on Monetary Policy Decisions by the ECB, 16 December 2021)
- Implementation of tiered reserve remuneration systems
  - In the Euro Area, Switzerland,
    Japan...
  - With vastly different rules

#### Research Questions

- What is the design of an optimal tiered reserve remuneration system?

- How successful can a tiered remuneration system be in restoring the efficiency of MP under negative interest rates?

- Which factors should a tiered remuneration system target, macro variables (e.g. output gap) or financial variables (e.g. excess liquidity, equity ratios)? • Several findings point to low (or even negative) interest rates becoming the norm in the future (e.g. Schmelzing, 2020)



#### Literature

#### **Empirical**:

• Ampudia and Van Heuvel (2018), Basten and Mariathasan (2018, 2020), Molyneux et al. (2019)

### Theoretical:

• Brunnermeier and Koby (2019), Eggertson et al. (2019), Ulate(2021)

- The aim of the project is to study the effects of a tiered reserve remuneration system, which
  - prevents the erosion of bank capital/equity
  - while preserving the expansionary effect of monetary policy,

on the efficiency of monetary policy under low/ negative interest rate policy.

- Advantage of Ulate's (2021) framework opposed to others
  - Both beneficial and detrimental effects of NIRP on the economy
  - Positive effect via bank lending channel, negative effect via the bank net worth channel

#### • Model structure

Methodology

- Five types of agents: households, intermediate good producers, capital producers, retailers and banks
- Rich model is necessary to match quantitatively the behaviour of real-world economies

## Distinct Features

(1) Monopolistic competition in the banking sector (CES framework)  $L_{j} = \left(\frac{1+i_{j}^{l}}{1+i^{l}}\right)^{-\epsilon^{l}} L, \quad \gamma_{j} = \left(\frac{m_{j}}{m}\right)^{-\epsilon^{l}} D_{j} = \left(\frac{1+i_{j}^{d}}{1+i^{d}}\right)^{-\epsilon^{d}} D \quad \text{if } i_{j}^{d} \ge 0; \quad 0 \quad \text{if } i_{j}^{d} < 0$ 

## Hypotheses / Potential Results

- (1) If the policy rate i is above the threshold  $\tilde{i}$ , i.e.,  $i > \tilde{i}$ ,
  - changes in the policy rate translate

– allows for expansionary negative interest rate policy

(2) Deviation cost from loan-to-equity ratio

$$\Psi(L_t(j)/F_t(j);\kappa,\nu) = \kappa\nu \frac{L_t(j)}{F_t(j)} \left( ln\left(\frac{L_t(j)}{F_t(j)}\right) - ln\nu - 1 \right) + \kappa\nu^2$$

(3) Non-immediate adjustment to optimal level of equity

- no negative dividend payments after shocks
- fraction  $\varsigma$  of bank net worth is used up each period
- Frictions (2) and (3) ensure the existence of the bank net worth channel

$$\mathbb{E}_t(1+i_{t+1}^l) = \frac{\epsilon^l}{\epsilon^l-1}(1+i_t+\mu_t^l) + \kappa\nu\frac{\epsilon^l}{\epsilon^l-1}\left(\ln\left(\frac{L_t}{F_t}\right) - \ln(\nu)\right)$$

directly into changes in the loan and deposit rate (loan and deposit spread stay constant)

 tiered reserve system does not have any effect here

(2) If the policy rate i is below the threshold  $\tilde{i}$ but above a lower threshold  $\underline{i}$ , i.e.,  $\underline{i} < i < \tilde{i}$ ,

- changes in the policy rate compress
  the deposit spread due to the zero
  lower bound on deposits
- tiered reserve system eases pressure
  on bank equity, thereby increasing
  the efficiency of monetary policy